How Ukrainian ground robots fight, deliver weapons, and save lives

He highlighted Ukraine's main principle in the war: people are irreplaceable. 

As Russia wages war by burning through manpower, Ukraine is choosing a different path — moving humans out of the kill zone and sending machines forward instead: deliver supplies to the zero line, evacuate wounded soldiers, and increasingly kill Russian troops.

“For the Russians, it’s cheaper to send people. We don’t have people — so we build robots,” Poritskyi explained.

Fog, silence — and a robot

On Dec. 10, 2025, dense fog covered the frontline. FPV drones stayed grounded, quadcopters went blind, and even thermal optics saw nothing but white haze. For a Russian MT-LB armored transporter, it looked like a rare chance: rush forward, deploy an assault group, pull back.

Instead, Ukrainian uncrewed machine was waiting on the road.

Fighters from 5th Separate Assault Brigade deployed a Droid TW 12.7 ground robotic combat system precisely because they expected the Russians to take the risk amid harsh weather conditions. Armed with a 12.7 mm Browning machine gun, the robot moved along the roadside while its cameras scanned ahead. The operator sat more than a kilometer away, in safety.

When the armored vehicle appeared on the monitor, the operator opened fire.

“The Russian driver was killed, the vehicle lost control,” Poritskyi recalled.

The MT-LB veered off the road and slammed into a tree. Overhead reconnaissance footage later showed six or seven bodies scattered around the wreck. The assault group meant to attack Ukrainian positions ceased to exist.

It was the first documented case in world history of a ground robot destroying armored equipment in real combat.

“This trend is significant and could lead to further military breakthroughs,” said Ben Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in an interview with the Associated Press.

From experiments to mass production

Ukraine’s ground robots are no longer prototypes. In 2025 alone, nearly 15,000 UGVs were delivered to the military. Plans for 2026 exceed 20,000 units.

As of the Brave1 defense-tech innovation platform:

• more than 270 Ukrainian companies are developing UGVs,

• over 70 systems have already been codified,

• and in October alone, ground robots delivered almost 300 tons of cargo to frontline positions.

Poritskyi made a simple conclusion:

“Robots take the risks. People stay alive.”

Logistics under fire

To understand Ukraine's way to deploying combat robots, Poritskyi said, you have to start with delivery.

In 2023–2024, frontline logistics relied on armored vehicles and heavy bomber drones — the so-called “Baba Yagas” — capable of carrying 5–10 kg of cargo. But one drone cost about UAH1.5 million ($35k+), and being shot down by a cheap FPV is a total loss. Pickup trucks and Humvees fare no better: Russian thermal optics spot them from kilometers away.

Units did the math — and searched for alternatives.

Ground robots proved ideal. A small vehicle crawling along cratered roads is a far less visible target. And once compact Starlink Mini terminals appeared in early 2025, communications stopped being an issue. Operators could control robots remotely, with first-person video, from any distance.

Today:

• up to 80% of UGV missions are logistics,

• 20–30% are medical evacuation.

Robots deliver food, water, ammunition, and FPV drones to positions where operators may be 10 kilometers away from the zero line. Driving a pickup there is now unthinkable.

The economics are brutal but clear. One UGV typically survives 7–8 trips before being hit. At a cost of ₴600,000–700,000 ($15,800–18,400), each mission comes out to ₴75,000–87,000 ($2,000–2,300)— roughly the price of a single quadcopter. For that, 150–200 kg of cargo reaches an area where any movement is under fire.

“There are cases where soldiers say: either we do this mission today, or the guys at the zero line won’t survive — there’s no food, no water,” Poritskyi said.

In moments like this, cost is irrelevant.

Crucially, damage doesn’t always mean loss. If a robot isn’t destroyed at the zero line, it can be recovered, repaired, and sent back for five to seven more missions. Some machines have completed 15 missions. Others are destroyed on their first run. But overall, the system works.

Robots vs manpower

The contrast with Russia is stark. Russian units still send people for the same tasks — on motorcycles, quad bikes, horses, even donkeys.

Ukrainian UGVs are also dramatically cheaper than foreign analogues. An Estonian system costs €200,000–300,000 ($218,000–327,000) and can only operate in rear areas. Ukrainian robots start at $5,000–6,000, with fully equipped systems — Starlink, digital comms, high-capacity batteries — topping out around $20,000.

There’s also a disposable category: kamikaze ground drones carrying 5–6 kg of explosives. Costing up to $5,000, they can destroy entire fortified positions.

From delivery to firepower

Once logistics are covered, the next demand is protection.

Units began asking for weapon turrets after Russian ambushes started targeting unarmed robots. Thus emerged combat UGVs — still fewer in number, but rapidly growing.

Only three Ukrainian companies now produce over 100 combat robots per month, but these machines are opening a new chapter of warfare.

Their typical mission:

• move into position,

• remain stationary for two to three days,

• scan the area with thermal optics.

No food. No water. No rotation. Just batteries.

The turret slowly sweeps its sector. The operator doesn’t even need to watch continuously — the system alerts them when heat or movement is detected.

One documented case from the Security Service of Ukraine shows a robot controlling a road. When three Russian soldiers appeared, the operator identified the targets and opened fire. One was killed instantly. Another was pinned down by machine-gun fire for half an hour — unable to move — until an FPV drone arrived to finish the job.

Earlier that same day, the Droid TW 12.7 destroyed two Russian “waiting FPVs” — drones lying on the road, set to detonate under passing vehicles. The operator simply shot them as they detonated, and the robot kept moving.

What comes next

Poritskyi predicts that by late 2026, the so-called “kill zone” — where any movement is under fire — will expand from 20 km to 50 km.

That means robots will need:

• 100 km range (50 km out, 50 back),

• hybrid engines instead of batteries,

• semi-autonomous navigation in jammed environments.

“We’re working on solutions to make any vehicle remotely controlled,” Poritskyi said.

"From M113s and Humvees to civilian pickups. Removing the human from the cabin makes the vehicle usable again."

According to Samuel Bendett of the Center for a New American Security, full autonomy is still far off — but Ukraine is moving faster than anyone else.

The next frontier is group operations: logistics robots moving under the cover of armed ones; multiple combat robots advancing together.

“There’s a machine gunner, a grenadier, a sapper — robots should work the same way,” Poritskyi said.

His vision of the frontline in two or three years is stark:

“Only robots will fight," he predicted.

"The first line will be robots only. Humans will stay back — maintaining, repairing, replacing. Under fire, there will be no people.”

If Ukraine succeeds, Russian human-wave assaults against positions manned only by machines will become suicidal.

“If we solved this in the air,” Poritskyi concluded, “we can solve it on the ground too.”

And then the war — and the cost of fighting it — will look very different.