Russia plans winter push for Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk — Ukrainian Major

 — There is a lot of information that the Russians are redeploying some of their units from northern Ukraine to Donetsk Oblast because that is where they are currently under the most pressure. Yesterday, there was information that the Russians had made a long “pocket” — an incursion — in the direction of Dobropillia. Azov also reported that in their zone of responsibility — they entered specifically on the Pokrovsk front — about 150 enemy personnel were killed, some were captured, and many were wounded. Russian social media channels wrote that the 10-plus kilometer incursion had already been cut off, and now what appears to be their 55th brigade is surrounded — without food, water, or supplies. Is this a matter of reacting quickly? Or should we focus more on the fact that such things should not be happening at all? How do we find the balance here?

— There are things that happen, and we cannot influence them right now. We can analyze the reasons for these events.

There are two components to what happened near Dobropillia — objective and subjective factors.

Subjective factors are planning mistakes and unreliable information being passed from platoons upward. In practice, reports may claim certain positions are under control, but in reality, they are not, and when units rotate, we see these kinds of collapses at the front.

There are also objective factors. The enemy has numerical superiority, outnumbers our Armed Forces, and shows no regard for its manpower, being ready to throw it into the fight and ready to die.

A clear example occurred last week. A group of 150 Russian soldiers left Selydove; only 30 made it to Pokrovsk. The Russians presented this as a major victory, that 30 members of a sabotage and reconnaissance group entered Pokrovsk. This clearly shows how the Russians treat their personnel.

What is happening today at Dobropillia involves small groups using motorized infantry raids and reconnaissance groups that penetrated quickly. If they were promptly cut off and surrounded, this is, in fact, a positive story for us about how we were able to destabilize the enemy in that sector.

— Fire brigades, so to speak, are being thrown in there, including Azov and other units that have been attached and subordinated during the transition to a corps system. I understand this does not add calm, but it is something we must do, even if it is difficult. How do you assess this?

— We must. There are things that are being done.

Last week, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported at the Staff meeting that his military cabinet, led by Pavlo Palisa, deputy head of the Office of the President and a colonel, is implementing a number of important reforms in the military. They have launched them.

This includes the ability to purchase used equipment and additional funds for combat battalions — an extra 7 million UAH ($175,000) per battalion in a brigade — so they can purchase drones in a decentralized manner.

So, certain actions are being taken. It cannot be said that everything is bad or that nothing is happening. The same applies to recruitment. The 18-24 program for drones has been launched to recruit young men to participate in repelling aggression.

The state is providing options. But at the same time, there are aspects that are not OK, which we have already mentioned, including poor coordination and unreliable information.

Overall, the situation at Pokrovsk is very difficult, and in Donetsk Oblast in general, it is very difficult. This is the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka-Kramatorsk section of our defensive line, where fighting is indeed hard for us — because the enemy has superiority, and significant superiority at that.

The enemy aims, by late autumn — before the leaves fall — to enter these settlements and occupy as many as possible to protect themselves from our drones, which will be able to target their crews and groups in the open. This is their objective before the end of autumn.

— I remember there was an order from Vladimir Putin to capture entire Donetsk Oblast by Sept. 1. These plans keep getting pushed back. But there are now more than 110,000 Russian troops in that area, which is a huge advantage. Nevertheless, they are unable to advance as quickly as ordered. How do you assess this? What problems do they have?

— The issue with their “meat” assaults is, first and foremost, the tie to specific dates. To serve higher up, they are ready to throw in huge amounts of resources to advance and make so-called flag plantings. Their disregard for personnel is one of their key problems.

And of course, there is the matter of old approaches and methods of war — Soviet-era methods — that they use to advance. Yes, they adapt, and yes, there are some good, effective developments in their army. They are not standing still. But overall, they are slow to change because they are an old, Soviet-style systemic army, and these problems remain.

To summarize: a) commanders willing to sacrifice troops; b) a lack of technological sophistication; c) an inability to adapt quickly to…

— To the conditions now on the front line. And the notion that if unit X has few killed, it means they are fighting poorly — I understand this rule still applies to them.

— Yes, exactly. The main thing is to kill, to sacrifice people, to serve higher up, and to plant the flag as quickly as possible on a given sector of the front, to enter a given settlement.

— All right, if we assume a cease-fire could be announced after a meeting in Alaska between U.S. President Donald Trump and Putin — which I do not believe — how realistic is such a cease-fire? Would it take effect, or would it be implemented over months? Even during the Minsk agreements in 2015-2016, there was never complete silence on the front; something was always happening.

— The key factor here is that, first, I also do not believe in a halt in the coming months. What does Putin want? For us to voluntarily leave Donbas. That will not happen, because it is our territory. And President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated that negotiations should be held on the line of contact. Then we can discuss something.

Secondly, you are absolutely right: hostilities will not stop quickly because we need to maintain security along the entire 1,200-kilometer line of contact. We will need a large military to continue serving, protecting these positions, and establishing systematic work.

So I will disappoint some by saying the war will probably not end quickly. One way or another, fighting will continue. Clashes will occur, perhaps not as intense or active, but they will still take place.

— On security guarantees. The impossibility for Russia to forbid Ukraine from moving toward NATO is one matter, but another matter — from Trump — is that the United States is ready to provide Ukraine with certain security guarantees in the event of a cease-fire, but not within NATO. What does that mean? What is this separation?

— We would very much like to know what that is, to understand it clearly. If it is weapons, then show us what weapons. If it is significant rearmament, then let’s talk about rearmament — put your capabilities on the table. We will discuss what these guarantees and this rearmament entail.

If it is about the economy and finances, then show the figure, the amount of investment in the economy. Because the question is: what kind of guarantees are these?

It is important for us to understand what we are talking about so it is not a cat in the bag: “You make peace, you stop, and later we will talk about some issues someday.” No, it cannot be like that. This must be presented right away as part of the negotiation package, and then, as they say, we can determine the points of contact.