Russian northern offensive in Chernihiv Oblast is doomed - NV analysis

Full-scale war could return to Chernihiv Oblast, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) Oleksandr Syrskyi stated the day before.

According to him, Vladimir Putin has tasked his General Staff with calculating various options for conducting an offensive operation to capture Kyiv and other Ukrainian territories — including from the territory of Belarus.

Syrskyi expressed doubt that Alexander Lukashenko's regime would dare to make his country a staging ground for the Russians. Therefore, in the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, the most likely option is an enemy offensive from Russia's Bryansk Oblast into Chernihiv Oblast.

"This is a realistic option, and of course, we are preparing for it. Russian [offensive is possible] in Chernihiv Oblast—with the aim of diverting some of our troops from the main critical directions, including those where we are conducting active operations," Syrskyi added.

NV evaluated the resources Russia would need for a northern offensive and whether Putin would dare to launch one.

A real offensive or provocations?

One of the main intentions of the Russian command remains the maximum expansion of the active front line, explained Oleksii Hetman, a military expert and retired major, to NV.

Now its length is about 1,250 kilometers, and opening a new operational direction from the Bryansk region could increase it by approximately another 160 kilometers.

"Opening new sectors or activating existing ones will allow the enemy to force Ukraine to disperse its reserves, weaken its strike groups, and complicate troop management," Hetman added.

According to the expert, to conduct any sort of offensive operations, the Russians need to form a group of 50,000–60,000 troops. At present, movements of this number of people are not observed, but this does not require much time — a few days are sufficient.

"Our military command is perfectly aware of this," Hetman assured.

"And we are taking the appropriate steps to respond as best as possible if this happens, or to prevent the Russians from conducting anything significant altogether."

At the same time, Pavlo Narozhnyi, a military expert and founder of the Reactive Post charitable organization, emphasized: breaking through the Ukrainian defense in the north and penetrating deep into the territory of Chernihiv Oblast will be very difficult for the Russians, as a significant portion of the borderland here is occupied by rivers.

And to advance even 5–7 kilometers through Chernihiv Oblast, the enemy will need at least 70,000–100,000 troops. For a more effective advance, even more is needed—100,000–150,000. That is about a sixth or a seventh of the entire Russian force now directed against Ukraine.

To assemble the group needed for an offensive in Chernihiv Oblast, Russian generals would have to redeploy troops from other sectors. The most likely "donor" could be the southern section of the general front. According to Hetman, this refers to units now fighting in Zaporizhzhya Oblast — primarily highly mobile units of the airborne troops.

However, as Narozhnyi emphasized, if the enemy resorts to such "castling," they will gradually lose the south and that very "land corridor" from Russia to occupied Crimea. Therefore, the expert does not expect these decisions from the Russian General Staff, nor similar actions regarding the weakening, for the sake of an offensive in the north, of the group now assaulting the north of Donetsk Oblast.

Russia could also assemble a contingent for a northern offensive during mobilization or select something from the strategic reserve. But, firstly, this requires quite a lot of time — a new wave of mobilization in Russia hasn't even been officially announced, and the combat capability of such troops would appear questionable.

To carry out a major breakthrough, as Hetman explained, a division (from 6,000 to 25,000 soldiers) must advance on a 40-kilometer sector, break through the front line to a width of 6–7 kilometers, and advance 10–15 kilometers deep to then try to reach the rear. This requires aviation support, heavy equipment (tanks and armored vehicles), and light equipment (motorcycles and buggies).

Using heavy equipment is almost impossible, as it is immediately destroyed by drones. Given this, the Russians might resort to a creeping offensive and try to advance in small infantry groups. "However, to approach the line where our troops are located, for contact small arms combat to occur, the Russians need to dismount from their vehicles about 25–30 kilometers away. Because if they get closer, our drones will get them there," Hetman explained.

"Therefore, before making an offensive in small groups, they have to walk 30 kilometers on foot — in full gear, with ammunition, grenades. Someone is also dragging a machine gun, someone a small grenade launcher."

Considering all the above, Narozhnyi considers a more realistic scenario not a large-scale invasion involving 70,000–100,000 personnel, but provocative actions on the border in the format of artillery and drone shelling. The Russians need this so that Ukraine redeploys combat-ready brigades to the north from other directions, or directs the flow of mobilized personnel there.

"What Syrskyi says, that we will have to form new brigades and redeploy them to the north of Ukraine—that is exactly what the Russians are hoping for," the expert explained.

"That our units in the Donbas, in the south will not receive reinforcements, and all these reinforcements will go to mitigate the situation [in the north]. If such a thing happens, of course."

"A problem, but not a disaster"

Ukraine is ready to repel Russian attacks in the north, the military experts who spoke with NV are confident.

"If we see that a Russian strike group is forming there, then we have the ability to send assault units there, which do not have a fixed location, patching holes where there are any gaps," Hetman emphasized.

"And we also have [for reinforcement] infantry units, brigades that can hold the defense."

He added that new brigades are constantly being prepared and existing ones are being replenished in Ukraine.

A possible offensive into Chernihiv Oblast will stretch Ukrainian defense. In such a case, brigades that could have reinforced another direction will have to be directed to the north.

"This is a problem, but not a disaster," Hetman added.

Moving through the territory of Chernihiv Oblast in general is very difficult due to the complex terrain — forests, rivers, swamps, streams, Narozhnyi noted. And the bridges across them can always be blown up.

Moreover, during 2023–2024, when Serhii Nayev commanded AFU Joint Forces, over 500,000 anti-tank mines were planted on the northern border of Ukraine. Additionally, engineering fortifications, including defensive structures, have been built directly on the border.

"The probability that the enemy will be able to penetrate significantly (more than a few kilometers) into our territory is very low," Narozhnyi is confident.

"This entire sector is mined, it's continuous minefields. Any soldier who comes, any vehicle that arrives, will be moving through minefields under artillery fire and drone strikes. It will be not just hard for the Russians to do this, but very, very, very hard."