Analysts predict two scenarios for southern front as Ukraine targets supply lines

On June 25, Defense Forces raised the Ukrainian flag on the Kinburn Spit — the westernmost edge of the Russian-occupied left bank of the Dnipro River.

For now, there is no talk of creating a bridgehead there for the further liberation of southern Kherson Oblast.

"As of right now, the Kinburn Spit is a combat zone," explained Dmytro Pletenchuk, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Navy.

However, events in that area appear to be the first noticeable shift in Ukraine's favor on this sector of the front.

The following day, other news emerged that initially seemed unrelated to the flag on the spit: the occupational authorities in Crimea declared a state of emergency on the peninsula. The formal explanation was to address economic issues. But in reality, the region — where some officials once loudly cheered the "return to the native harbor" — is now facing genuine hardship: critical fuel shortages, power and water supply interruptions, a tourist season postponed until September, and doubtful prospects for improvement.

Both news items are pieces of a single large puzzle that Ukraine is gradually and confidently assembling in the Russian-occupied south. Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov recently outlined its core idea: it seems Crimea will soon become an island, leading to highly unexpected consequences for the Russians.

A Ukrainian officer, whose subordinates' efforts are shaping this "unexpected" reality for the Russians, spoke more concisely on the topic — Robert (Madiar) Brovdi, head of the Unmanned Systems Forces. He promised: "In the near future, we will isolate Crimea."

But Crimea is only part of the aforementioned puzzle. The logistical isolation of the peninsula means severing supplies across the entire Russian-occupied south: from the Crimean Bridge across the Crimean isthmuses, through the land of Kherson and Zaporizhzhya oblasts to Berdyansk, and further to Mariupol. This means the occupiers' entire frontline in the region will be under threat.

The Crimean peninsula, according to military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko, is not an end in itself for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is merely a transit hub that affects the entire occupied south of Ukraine.

Lonely Crimea

Since late May, Ukrainian drones in the south have systematically destroyed logistics — bridges and railways — with their medium-range (middle-strikes) and long-range (deep-strikes) attacks, while also hitting fuel supplies, energy infrastructure, and destroying enemy air defense systems.

The most significant pressure has fallen on logistics. Overnight on June 18, and then on June 22–23, Special Operations Forces finished off the railway bridge over the North Crimean Canal near Rozdolne — its destruction was confirmed by Planet Labs satellite imagery. The railway bridge in Vladyslavivka, as well as bridges on the isthmuses near Chonhar and Armiansk, have been destroyed or damaged, and the railway junction in Dzhankoi has been struck.

Pressure is also mounting at sea: the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk have come under attack, drones are hunting Russian vessels at sea, and of the seven ferries that provided crossings between Russia and Crimea at the start of the year, only two might be left.

Although the Crimean Bridge has survived so far, traffic on it is blocked for several hours during air attacks — as this Putin "megaproject" now allows mostly only passenger cars to pass.

Gradually, since March, Defense Forces have been destroying the enemy's rear logistics in the occupied areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhya oblasts — primarily along the highway from Mariupol to Berdyansk, Melitopol, and further to the entrance to Crimea. Ukrainian drones dominate there, leaving Russian fuel trucks, cargo vehicles, and military equipment burning.

"Thus, the mainland supply of the Russian grouping is being completely cut off," Kovalenko says.

According to Brovdi's estimates, traffic to Crimea has dropped by 71% over the last two weeks. The commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces explained that hitting Russian cargo in the south is like "shooting partridges in an open field."

The second direction methodically disabled by Ukrainian deep-strikes is fuel and energy. In the last month alone, Crimean oil depots in Yedy-Kuiu near Kerch and in Feodosia, an oil terminal in Kerch, four gas compressor stations, and the Hlibivske underground gas storage facility on Tarkhankut were hit. The peninsula's occupational authorities have banned the sale of gasoline to the public for several days now, restricting it to emergency services only.

The culmination was a strike overnight on June 25 on the main substation of the Sevastopol power plant — it plunged about half of the peninsula into darkness.

Military expert Kostyantyn Mashovets compares the consequences of these events to a domino effect: supply issues with fuel in Crimea led to electricity problems, and then to water shortages, as critical water utility equipment lost power. Amid this, the resort season "sparkles with new bright colors," the expert ironically noted — the occupational authorities have already announced that children's sanatoriums on the peninsula will not operate until Sept. 1.

Why can't the enemy quickly "patch" these "holes"? Energy analyst Hennadii Riabtsev calls the peninsula an "energy dead end without its own ring network, dependent on a single artery from Russia." In other words, hitting Crimean energy infrastructure is easy, but repairing it is long and expensive.

The third target of Ukrainian attacks is air defense and the Black Sea Fleet. Drones and missiles are methodically taking out S-400 air defense systems, radars, and anti-aircraft weapons: according to official statements, hangars at the Saky airfield, air defense elements near Kerch, and radar stations have been hit since late June. The Russian fleet itself was long ago pushed out of Crimean waters and locked up in Novorossiysk.

Naval analyst HI Sutton formulates this figuratively in an article for Naval News: Novorossiysk's protective breakwaters are "turning into a cage," because the Russians have no other port to retreat to on the Black Sea.

The Ukrainian side, according to Navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk, believes that a third of the enemy's Black Sea Fleet has already been disabled, destroyed, or damaged.

Momentum is Needed

Could Crimea really become an island? Western analysts are cautious: yes, but everything depends on momentum.

Christina Harward from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) believes the campaign's effects will mature in the coming weeks "if Ukraine maintains its current pace," where medium-range strikes are increasing and Russia has yet to find effective countermeasures.

Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, emphasizes that advances in drone technology indeed make cutting off Crimea realistic over time, but pushing back Russian forces with UAV strikes alone will not work — a coordinated ground operation is required.

Natia Seskuria, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), voices her own caution: assessing whether Ukraine can completely cut off Crimea is still premature. Russia maintains a land corridor through the occupied south and has almost completed the Rostov-Crimea railway.

But with this very "land corridor" — or rather, with strikes on it — the Russians face another problem, one not directly related to Crimea.

Mashovets explained that Ukrainian aerial control over the highways in Kherson Oblast and near Melitopol, Berdyansk, and Mariupol threatens the logistics of the two Russian groupings in the Southern Operational Zone, known as Dnepr and Vostok (East). This is especially relevant for the former, whose area of responsibility "includes" the Kinburn Spit mentioned earlier — logistics here stretch for over 400 km from Mariupol.

Defense Forces' middle-strikes, according to Mashovets, lead to the "defragmentation" of Russian supply: it loses its centralized nature, and the transshipment and distribution of cargo between the operational and tactical levels are sharply complicated. This could become the decisive factor of the entire summer campaign in the south.

Frontline units of the Russian forces near the Dnipro River are already experiencing shortages.

The next step, Kovalenko predicts, will be regular aerial control over the Crimean Bridge — Ukrainian drone operators could establish this as early as late June or early July.

Two Scenarios for the South

Moscow is adapting to the new threats, investing in the infrastructure of the so-called Azov Transport Ring, and analysts warn that Ukraine's current advantage in drones will not last forever.

What will the state of the parties in the south be by the end of the year? Kovalenko outlined two scenarios.

The first is that Ukraine will disrupt the Russian summer campaign. That is, the offensive in Zaporizhzhya Oblast will halt, the enemy will lose the ability to conduct operations in the lower reaches of the Dnipro River, and Defense Forces will liberate some territories south and east of Zaporizhzhia — from Stepnohirsk to Kamianske, near Orikhiv, and possibly near Huliaypole and further.

The second scenario, in Kovalenko's opinion, could be the most optimistic for Ukraine: the Armed Forces neutralize not only the enemy's offensive capabilities but also their defensive ones. In this case, the Defense Forces could transition to intensive counterattacks that could develop into a counteroffensive — primarily in Kherson Oblast. Ultimately, by the end of the year, Ukrainian units would reach the administrative border with Crimea.